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Abstract
We present experimental evidence regarding individual and group decisions over
time. Static and longitudinal methods are combined to test four conditions on
time preferences: impatience, stationarity, age independence, and dynamic consis-
tency. Decision making in groups should favor coordination via communication
about voting intentions. We find that individuals are neither patient nor consistent,
that groups are both patient and highly consistent, and that information exchange
between participants helps groups converge to stable decisions. Finally we provide
additional evidence showing that our results are driven by the specific role of groups
and not by either repeated choices or individual preferences when choosing for other
subjects.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Most economic models rely on the assumption that individuals and organizations
are consistent in their choices over time. Two central restrictions on time prefer-
ences – namely, stationarity and dynamic consistency – guarantee that some form
of consistency is achieved in decisions (Strotz, 1955; Bleichrodt et al., 2009). These
conditions are necessary if consistency is to be exhibited in the choices of an in-
dividual decision-maker (Halevy, 2015) or of several individuals coordinating on
a group intertemporal decision (Jackson and Yariv, 2014). The same conditions
must also be satisfied by any policy maker (Caplin and Leahy, 2004). Households,
boards, committees, and teams are examples of groups that need to deliberate and
coordinate their actions on important decisions that have a time dimension. Such
decisions include those related to retirement and saving, education and health care,
investments, providing effort and public goods, and building reputations.
Behavioral research on group decision making has shown that, comparatively
speaking, groups are more likely to make rational choices whereas individuals are
more likely to behave in a boundedly rational manner (Cooper and Kagel, 2005;
Charness and Sutter, 2012; Maciejovsky et al., 2013). Hence the expectation is that
intertemporal decisions made by a group are more consistent than those made by
an individual. For instance, Charness and Sutter (2012) suggest that an individual
who is prone to dynamic inconsistency in saving for retirement might achieve a
better retirement outcome through participation in group decision making. Such
participation could result in a better intertemporal decision with benefits that might
compensate for the costs associated with delegating part of the decision.
There is little empirical evidence on group decision making in intertemporal
choice. Yet numerous theoretical papers are devoted to group decision making
and the aggregation of time preferences. Under such aggregation, these papers
predict that a collective decision process will generally yield inconsistent choices
over time even if group members are individually consistent (Gollier and Zeckhauser,
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2005; Zuber, 2010; Jackson and Yariv, 2015); if so, then the consequence could
be inefficient behavior (Schaner, 2015). Empirical evidence on the aggregation of
individual time preferences supports this view. For example, Jackson and Yariv
(2014) report that a large majority of subjects acting as social planners are present-
biased and that only 2% of them exhibit consistent behavior.
The within-subject experiment described in this paper yields new lab evidence
on the outcome resulting from individual and collective decisions. Following Halevy
(2015), we combined static and longitudinal experimental methods to address the
issue of stationarity and consistency of time preferences but without committing to a
particular functional representation. More specifically, we tested four conditions on
time preferences at both the individual and group levels: impatience, stationarity,
age independence, and dynamic consistency. For group decisions, we designed a
coordination mechanism based on majority voting preceded by a deliberation phase
among the participants.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In line with the existing lit-
erature on intertemporal choice, individuals were impatient and tended to deviate
from consistent behavior. In contrast, groups typically made patient and highly
consistent decisions; those decisions were based on majority voting after a long se-
quence of information exchange between group members through a series of straw
polls. We observed that our coordination mechanism helped the groups to converge
and to make both stable and dynamically consistent decisions. Because our results
could have been driven by several confounding factors, we also implemented a series
of additional treatments. These robustness checks showed that no such factors (i.e.,
repetition, voting, or choosing for others) can explain the high degree of patience
and consistency displayed by the groups in our experiment.
1.2 Literature Review
Following Samuelson (1937) and Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982), a large part of
the theoretical literature on time preferences builds on discounted utility and addi-
tively separable functional forms that assume a separation between value and delay
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in assessing temporal sequences of outcomes. A typical example is the exponential
discounting utility model, which assumes stationarity of time preferences and serves
as the workhorse of many economic models. The discounted utility model’s repre-
sentation of time preferences has the additional advantage of facilitating empirical
measurements. With an extra assumption on the linearity of utility, measures of
discount factors and discount rates can be carried out by way of simple experiments
(Thaler, 1981; Coller and Williams, 1999). If one instead assumes nonlinear utility
then measurements become more sophisticated yet also more complex (Andreoni
and Sprenger, 2012b). All these measures share the potential descriptive limita-
tions of the discounted utility model. If this model misrepresents time preferences,
then so do all measurements based on that model. An alternative route is proposed
by Rohde (2010) and Halevy (2015). These authors demonstrate that several basic
properties of time preferences – including conditions on stationarity, dynamic con-
sistency, and age independence – can be inferred empirically from direct conditions
on preferences and also without committing to a specific functional representation of
preferences. Our experiment follows that route and focuses on the basic conditions
of choice over time without assuming any particular functional form.
The empirical literature on time preference has elicited an extremely wide variety
of discount rates. Frederick et al. (2002) report elicited discount rates ranging from
less than 1% (Thaler, 1981) to more than 1,000% (Holcomb and Nelson, 1992).
Furthermore, individuals often exhibit present-bias and thus violate stationarity
(Benzion et al., 1989; Kirby and Marakovic´, 1995; Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 2001;
DellaVigna, 2009). However, more recent studies show that experiments can limit
this well-established stylized fact – at least for monetary choices – by controlling
for transaction costs and payment risk (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a; Augenblick
et al., 2015). Stationarity is the key axiom underlying the discounted utility model’s
standard hypothesis of a constant discount rate. A decision exhibits ’stationarity’
when it does not change in response to uniformly delayed receipts.
Stationarity should be distinguished from “dynamic consistency”, under which
a decision regarding the future made at one time is not changed at a later time.
Testing for dynamic consistency therefore requires a longitudinal experimental de-
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sign (Horowitz, 1992; Sayman and O¨ncu¨ler, 2009; Casari and Dragone, 2015; Meier
and Sprenger, 2015), which explains the relative scarcity of experimental studies
devoted to dynamic consistency. Those that do exist report mixed results. On
the one hand, Horowitz (1992) and Meier and Sprenger (2015) report time con-
sistency at the aggregate level but not at the individual level. Gine´ et al. (2014)
observe 65% of study participants to be dynamically inconsistent – despite being
reminded of their past choices – and Kang and Ikeda (2014) report non-negligible
time variations in longitudinal survey measures of time preferences.1 On the other
hand, Sayman and O¨ncu¨ler (2009) find no evidence in favor of time inconsistency
for short delays. Halevy (2015) report that 48% of the subject were time consistent.
Augenblick et al. (2015) report that while 60% of their subjects were time consis-
tent in monetary choices, that percentage declined to 25% for time consistency in
real-effort tasks.
Evidence on group choice over time mainly concerns impatience. Available stud-
ies suggest that groups are more patient than their individual members. For ex-
ample, individuals are more patient when making a joint decision with a partner
than when making a decision for themselves. This statement holds whether the
group consists of a decision-making real-life couple (Carlsson et al., 2012) or an
experimental ’artificial’ couple (Shapiro, 2010). Carlsson et al. (2012) also find that
couple-made decisions violate stationarity. For larger groups, collective patience has
been reported in groups of three to seven people (Shapiro, 2010; Denant-Boemont
and Loheac, 2011).
Coordination mechanisms are central to group decision making. The most fre-
quently used mechanisms in experiments are majority voting and unanimity. For
example, Denant-Boemont and Loheac (2011) implement an unanimity rule in col-
lective choice over time and find that it generates more patient choices than does
majority voting. Unanimity does have some undesirable features, however. First,
the length of the decision process is unknown; it differs among groups and also by
decision. Accommodation is crucial for arriving at a unanimous group decision, and
1 Meier and Sprenger (2015) also report non-negligible time-variations in experimental measures.
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the number of rounds needed to reach that stage is indeterminate. Moreover, as re-
ported by Viscusi et al. (2011), the extent of accommodation is greater with majority
than with unanimous decisions. Second, Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show that una-
nimity restricts the domain of implementable outcomes and eliminates some possible
outcomes that could be achieved by other, intermediate coordination mechanisms
– for example, the simple-majority voting rule. Majority voting is seldom enough
to achieve efficiency. Goeree and Yariv (2011) demonstrate experimentally that
collective deliberation can affect collective choice under various voting mechanisms.
In particular, voting without deliberation tends to make voters more strategic, in
which case voting behavior is more contingent on institutional rules. At the opposite
extreme, unrestricted deliberation among group members renders communication
itself more important than the issues being voted on. This result suggests that a
majority-vote collective decision process incorporating initial communication over
voting intentions may help participants coordinate more effectively when making a
collective choice. Our experiment implements just such a collective decision process
for choice over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the setting of the experiment
and offers some theoretical background on time preferences. Section 3 summarizes
the experimental results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Background and Experimental Design
The purpose of the experiment was to compare the results achieved by outcomes
resulting from collective and individual decisions over time. In a protocol similar
to the one used by Halevy (2015) for individual decision making, we combined six
indifference tasks to test four conditions on time preferences: impatience, station-
arity, age independence, and dynamic consistency. Whereas Halevy’s paper focuses
on individual decision making, we measure indifferences at both the individual and
the group level.
For the baseline experiment, we recruited 60 subjects from University of Rennes,
France, and asked them to state their preferences between different pairs of timed
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outcomes in three regularly spaced experimental sessions. Each pair of timed out-
comes proposed a choice between a smaller-sooner option and a larger-later option.
Half of the decisions were individual ones and half were collective. For collective
decisions, subjects were randomly assigned to twelve groups of five people each.
Group membership remained identical across all decisions and all experimental ses-
sions. Experimental instructions are described in Appendix B.
2.1 Experimental Tasks
Summary
Table 1 summarizes the choices between pairs of timed outcomes that were pre-
sented to subjects in the baseline experiment. This table shows the individual
choices; choices for five-member groups were identical except for the e100 outcome,
which for groups was multiplied by a factor of 5. Choices were spread across three
experimental sessions. Inspecting Table 1 reveals a number of similarities between
the proposed choices. For example, the table’s first row shows the same choice, but
made at three different times. In Session 1 and Session 2, the second row corre-
sponds to the first row except that receipts are both delayed by 4 weeks. Finally, the
choices proposed in the first row for Session 2 and Session 3 correspond to the choices
proposed (respectively) in the second row for Session 1 and Session 2 respectively.
These similarities will be used to test basic conditions on time preferences.
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Session 1 Session 2 (4 weeks later) Session 3 (4 weeks later)
amount at present vs. e100
in 4 weeks
amount at present vs. e100
in 4 weeks
amount at present vs. e100
in 4 weeks
amount in 4 weeks vs. e100
in 8 weeks
amount in 4 weeks vs. e100
in 8 weeks
amount at present vs. e100
in 8 weeks
Table 1: Summary of the individual choices between timed outcomes faced by subjects in
each of three experimental sessions.
Note: All rewards were paid out after a one-day waiting period.
Decisions
We consider the decision maker – either an individual or a group – faced with
choosing between timed outcomes. A timed outcome (t, x) results in the receipt of
a positive monetary outcome x ∈ X+ at date t ∈ T , where X+ represents the set
of consequences and T the set of future dates. The purpose of the experimental
tasks shown in Table 1 was to elicit indifference values between a smaller-sooner
time outcome and a larger-later one. We therefore use s with reference to the most
immediate (smaller-sooner) reward and ` with reference to the most delayed (larger-
later) reward. Indifference values were elicited through a series of choice questions
in order to determine the sooner outcome x for which a subject was indifferent with
respect to a given later outcome:
(s,x) ∼ (`, y).
Outcome y was kept constant during elicitation and across sessions; it was equal
to e100 in individual decisions and to e500 in collective decisions. Delays s and `
were varied across decision tasks to build testable conditions on time preferences.
Indifferences were elicited as follows. For each pair of timed outcomes, subjects
were faced with a choice between a series of timed outcomes: option A (the larger-
later outcome) and option B (the smaller-sooner outcome). Each subject was asked,
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immediately after switching from one option to the other, to quantify their indiffer-
ence between the two options. For this purpose, the screen displayed a scrollbar (see
Appendix C, Figure 7) that enabled subjects to specify their indifference points to
the e1 level of precision. This method is known to yield more reliable indifference
values than do procedures that ask respondents directly for those values (Bostic
et al., 1990; Noussair et al., 2004); it is also the usual practice employed in the
literature (for a review, see Takeuchi, 2011).
The elicitation process was repeated for each elicited indifference, and the re-
sulting experimental data are characterized formally defined in Table 2. Half of the
indifferences were elicited at the level of individual decisions and half at the level
of collective decisions. To control for order effects between individual and collec-
tive tasks, individuals preceded groups in only two thirds of the sessions, and the
reverse order was implemented in the remaining one-third. Because we focus on
the difference between individual and collective decisions, we kept the same order
(corresponding to Table’s 1 row order) within the individual and collective decisions
in all three experimental sessions. Hence any order effect that did arise would not
affect the difference between individual and collective decisions.
Session 1 (t) Session 2 (t+ ∆) Session 3 (t+ 2∆)
(s,x11) ∼t (`, y) (s+ ∆,x12) ∼t+∆ (`+ ∆, y) (s+ 2∆,x13) ∼t+2∆ (`+ 2∆, y)
(s+ ∆,x21) ∼t (`+ ∆, y) (s+ 2∆,x22) ∼t+∆ (`+ 2∆, y)
(s,x31) ∼t (`+ ∆, y)
Table 2: Elicited indifferences in each session.
Notes: For each session, decision times are given in parentheses and experimental data are shown in bold.
Each indifference is elicited by varying the sooner outcome until it reaches the indifference value; y =e100
in individual decisions and y = e500 in collective decisions, ∆ = ` = 4 weeks, s = day of the first session.
Rewards were paid out after a one-day waiting period.
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Incentives
Each subject was paid e20 for participating in three experimental sessions. This ap-
pearance fee was paid at the end of the last session to ensure that participants would
show up for all three of them. We also implemented a between-subject, random-task
incentive scheme following a Becker–De Groot–Marschak (BDM) procedure. Before
starting the experiment, subjects were informed that they might be selected to play
one of their choices for real and could win as much as e100 per session depending
on their choices. In order to prevent immediacy effects, we included a front-end de-
lay: all rewards were paid out after a one-day waiting period. The BDM procedure
was implemented as follows. At the end of each experimental session, the computer
selected one decision task at random. For that task, the computer selected one
possible decision between paired outcomes at random. To build this decision, an
integer d within the range of possible indifference values was selected at random
and the decision used for payment was
(s, d) vs. (`, y).
An indifference value x means that the decision maker prefers the larger later pay-
ment as long as the smaller sooner does not offer at least x. If d is lower than x,
one could infer that the selected choice should be (`, y) rather than (s, d), and the
larger later payment (`, y) was played out for real. Conversely, if the indifference
value x were lower than d then one could infer that the selected choice should be
(s, d), rather than (`, y), and then the smaller sooner payment (s, d) was played out
for real.
Because the BDM procedure was repeated for each of the three experimental
sessions, each subject could win a total amount of e300 over the three experimental
sessions.2 The probability of being selected in each session was independent and
identically distributed and was equal to one fifth. Selected subjects played their
choice for real at the end of each experimental session. We used a front-end delay to
2 We could not completely rule out wealth effects. For individuals who are paid for real at `+∆, those
previous gains might have affected behavior in Session 3. Since only three subjects met this condition, it
is reasonable to assume that wealth effects did not bias our results.
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minimize the possibility of perceived differences between the two payoff options with
respect both to transactions costs and to the risk associated with future payments.
This single-day front-end delay was also compatible with the payment scheme. One
difficulty for any experiment involving a trade-off between immediate and future
rewards is that subjects might not trust the experimenter to provide the promised
future rewards in a timely fashion. Toward the end of establishing trustworthiness
in the experiment and reducing fears of manipulation, all future payments were
warranted – and transferred directly to the subject’s bank account – by the National
Public Treasury.
Coordination Mechanism for Group Decisions
Within a given set of sessions, each subject participated in both individual and group
decision making. For group decisions, participants were aware from the beginning
that any group decision would be reached by a majority rule and would lead to an
’equal sharing of rewards’ rule. Each subject was randomly matched with four other
subjects at the beginning of the first session. We used a so-called partner-matching
design: each group remained the same during the entire experiment. Before reaching
a collective decision, group members were allowed to exchange information about
their preferences. The decision procedure took the form of a sequence of four suc-
cessive straw polls. Before each poll, every subject declared (to the other group
members) her own indifference value x such that (s, x) ∼t (`, y); this indifference
value corresponds to the collective outcomes x and y being equally shared among
group members. At each step in the sequence, subjects were informed of all mem-
bers’ indifference values prior to the next straw poll. Group members thus had four
opportunities to indicate their favorite option.
The information each subject received at the end of each sequence is displayed
in Figure 9 in the Appendix. The identity of each group’s member was referred to
by a color (brown, blue, purple, grey and beige). The colors remained the same for
a given collective choice, but they were changed randomly between sequential vote
processes in order to ensure anonymity and preclude any reputation effects.
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In the last step of the collective decision process, subjects were required to choose
collectively: they had to reach an agreement by majority voting. At the end of the
fifth sequence, the indifference amounts for the most immediate reward were ranked
from the lowest to the highest. The median value — that is, the option preferred
by the majority of the group members — was then applied to the entire group.
2.2 Time Preferences
We assume that the decision maker has preferences over the set of timed outcomes
T × X+. Following Halevy (2015), we endow the decision maker with a sequence
[%t]∞t=0 of complete and transitive binary relations defined over timed outcomes. We
assume that preferences satisfy the usual continuity and monotonicity assumptions,
and we use conventional notation to express the decision maker’s preference; thus
t, %t, and ∼t represent the relations of (respectively) strict preference for, weak
preference for, and indifference between the sequences of timed outcomes at decision
time t. Based on the elicited indifferences shown in Table 2, we investigate four
conditions related to time preferences: impatience, stationarity, age independence,
and dynamic consistency. We begin by defining these conditions formally as follows.
Definition 1 %t exhibits impatience if for any x and every t < s < `,
(s, x) t (`, x).
It follows from Definition 1 that impatience can also be defined as the indifference
at date t between a small outcome x received soon (at date s) and a larger outcome
y received later (at date `). So besides measuring impatience via comparison of
x and y, the experiment also manipulates delay ` to measure the “shape” of the
decision maker’s impatience. For each row i and column j in Table 2, impatience
holds whenever xij < y.
Definition 2 %t is stationary if, for x, y and every s, `,∆:
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(s, x) ∼t (`, y) ⇐⇒ (s+ ∆, x) ∼t (`+ ∆, y).
Stationarity means that a decision made at date t does not change when each
option’s payoff is delayed by the same amount of time. Under stationarity, then, the
choice between two timed outcomes depends only on the time distance `−s between
them. Stationarity is an important property of time preference and is one of the
key axiom in Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utility.3 Stationarity reflects
constant impatience, and it has been extensively investigated in the experimental
literature (see Frederick et al. (2002)). Decreasing impatience, or present-bias, is the
individual violation of stationarity most often identified in behavioral economics.4
In the first two columns of Table 2, comparing the first two rows provides a
direct test of the stationarity condition stated by Definition 2 (without assuming
the discounted utility model). If preferences are stationary, then we should observe
x11 = x
2
1 in column 1 and x
1
2 = x
2
2 in column 2. The farther from zero is the difference
x2j − x1j , (j = 1, 2), the greater are the violations of stationarity.
Definition 3 [%t]∞t=0 satisfies age independence if for x, y and every s, `,∆:
(s, x) ∼t (`, y) ⇐⇒ (s+ ∆, x) ∼t+∆ (`+ ∆, y).
Under age independence, which is also and more typically known as “time invari-
ance” (Halevy, 2015), a decision made at date t remains the same at date t+ ∆ if
all receipts are delayed by the same amount of time. According to this condition,
3 That axiomatization is based on five axioms – three technical conditions (continuity, sensitiv-
ity and boundedness), stationarity and an independence axiom – applied to time sequences (non-
complementarity). Bleichrodt et al. (2008) clarify Koopmans’ axioms, especially independence and sta-
tionarity, and propose a clean and complete preference axiomatization of discounted utility.
4 In the discounted utility model, violations of stationarity are not compatible with an exponential
discount function; hence they are represented by a wide range of alternative discount functions. Of
these, the most widely used are hyperbolic discount functions (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Loewenstein
and Prelec, 1992). Yet violations of stationarity can be accommodated also by nonhyperbolic discount
functions (Bleichrodt et al., 2009), which can more flexibly incorporate increasing impatience.
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preferences are independent of calendar time. The experimental test of age indepen-
dence manipulates the choice node by moving the choice date from t to t+∆ and the
front-end delay from s to s + ∆. In each row of Table 2, between-column compar-
isons provide a direct test of the age independence condition stated by Definition 3.
If preferences satisfy age independence then we should observe x11 = x
1
2 = x
1
3 in row
1 and x21 = x
2
2 in row 2. The larger the absolute differences between the x-values,
the greater the violations of age independence.
Definition 4 [%t]∞t=0 satisfies dynamic consistency if for x, y and every t+∆ < s, `:
(s, x) ∼t (`, y) ⇐⇒ (s, x) ∼t+∆ (`, y).
The state of dynamic consistency obtains provided a decision made at date t for
future timed outcomes remains the same for a given pair of timed outcomes when
made at date t+∆. Our experiment therefore moves the choice date from t to t+∆
while keeping the delay s constant. Both Sayman and O¨ncu¨ler (2009) and Read et al.
(2012) propose similar designs but with a different nomenclature.5 In both of those
papers, dynamic consistency is defined as longitudinal time consistency. Casari and
Dragone (2015) refer to our violations of stationarity, dynamic consistency, and age
independence as (respectively) static choice reversal, dynamic choice reversal, and
calendar choice reversal. In Table 2 within-diagonal comparisons between the first
two rows provide a direct test of dynamic consistency. If preferences satisfy dynamic
consistency, then we should observe x21 = x
1
2 and x
2
2 = x
1
3. The farther from zero
are the differences x21−x12 and x22−x13 are, the greater are the violations of dynamic
consistency.
Definitions 2, 3 and 4 are not independent because each pair of conditions implies
the other. For example, Strotz (1955) proves that stationarity (Definition 2) and
age independence (Definition 3) together imply dynamic consistency (Definition 4).
It follows that stationarity and dynamic consistency are equivalent if and only if age
independence is satisfied. These three definitions also show that time consistency
5 Our “stationarity” is their “cross-sectional time consistency”.
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and age independence together imply stationarity. As a result, violations of dynamic
consistency lead to violations of stationarity if one assumes that age independence
is satisfied. Yet if age independence is not satisfied then violations of dynamic
consistency need not result in violations of stationarity.6
2.3 Method
The indifference values elicited in both individual and collective tasks were designed
to test the four conditions (defined in Section 2.2) on time preferences. The first
information provided by a given elicited outcome is the amount of revealed impa-
tience. According to Definition 1, if the elicited outcome – that is, the “sooner”
value – was strictly lower than (resp., was equal to) the “later” value, then the
decision maker was considered to be impatient (resp., patient). The ratio of the
elicited outcome to the later outcome yields a simple index of impatience: the lower
the ratio, the greater the impatience with respect to a given decision.
By Definition 2, the difference x2j − x1j , j = 1, 2 provides a test for violations
of stationarity; it can be used to construct a simple index of stationarity violations
whereby the larger the deviations from zero, the greater the violations of stationarity.
The index can be computed either at date t (when j = 1, the index is defined as
x21 − x11) or at date t+ ∆ (when j = 2, the index if defined as x22 − x12).
Violations of age independence (Definition 3) are revealed by an index based on
the difference xi2 − xi1, i = 1, 2. This index can likewise be computed from date t
(when i = 1, the index is defined as x12 − x11) or from date t + ∆ (when i = 2, the
index is defined as x22 − x21). Comparing between x13 and x12 yields another index of
age independence.
Violations of dynamic consistency (Definition 4) can be similarly measured using
an index based on the difference between x2j and x
1
j+1, j = 1, 2. Values greater
(resp. less) than zero indicate standard (resp. reverse) dynamic inconsistency. In
6 For example, age independence is violated by a man who prefers one apple on his 21st birthday to
two apples the day after but in all other situations prefers two apples a day later. Such a decision maker
exhibits dynamic consistency but not stationarity.
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Section 3, we use two-sided Student tests to check for violations of stationarity, age
independence, an dynamic consistency. We checked for robustness via Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests and the (unreported) results were similar. For the purpose of
comparing individual and group decisions, we divided the indexes of stationarity,
age independence and dynamic consistency by a factor of 5 when evaluating decisions
made by (five-member) groups. The experimental tasks also allowed us to measure
discount factors – albeit at the cost of assuming a linear discounted utility model.
Under this assumption, any indifference (s, x) ∼t (`, y) results in the following
equality: δt(`) = δt(s)
x
y . If we use two indifferences whose delays ` differ, then
the ratio between the respective δt(`)-values yields an index that reflects what is
known as the shape of impatience. More specifically, that ratio indicates whether
the decision maker exhibits decreasing, constant, or increasing impatience.
Finally, we present two additional methods for analyzing collective choice. The
first evaluates the efficiency of straw polls as a coordinating device. This measure
compares the final vote to the last message sent to the other group members; it
corresponds to the measure used by Forsythe et al. (1993) to test voting equilibria.
The second method compares the group’s final decisions to its members’ individual
preferences. We assess the cost of deviating from individual preferences by sim-
ulating, for each collective decision, the corresponding decision that a benevolent
planner would make by aggregating individual indifferences.
3 Results
3.1 Time Preferences
Impatience
Elicited indifference values make for a simple way to characterize the decision be-
havior of individuals and of groups. Altogether, 42.3% of individual decisions were
patient; the proportion rose to 80.6% for groups. Group decisions were statistically
more likely to be patient than the equivalent individual decisions (binomial test,
p < 0.01). In order to investigate the pattern of discounting behaviors more thor-
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oughly, we first classified individual and groups based on their answers. A decision
maker was classified as impatient (resp. patient) if at least four out of six indifference
values yielded an impatient (resp. patient) answer; otherwise, the decision maker
was classified as mixed. On the one hand, a majority of individual decision mak-
ers were impatient – although a significant minority (30.4%) were patient. On the
other hand, a large majority (83.4%) of the groups were classified as patient. Thus,
collective behavior based on majority voting did not mirror individual behavior.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of average monthly discount rates inferred from
the five decisions involving a 4-week delay. The solid line represents the cumulative
distribution function for the group discount factors. This cumulative distribution
function orders the data by group from the more patients groups to the less patient
groups. In addition to group discount factors, for each group, the figure also shows
the discount factors corresponding to individual decisions (black dots) as well as the
discount factors corresponding to final votes (gray crosses).
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Figure 1: Average monthly discount rate for 4-week delays.
This graph plots the cumulative distribution function for group discount factors, and horizontal gray
lines are used to separate the groups. For each group, black dots mark the average discount factors of its
individual members and gray crosses indicate the average votes of those members.
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It is clear from this figure that group decisions differ from individual decisions
and that group decisions were in general much more patient that those made by
individuals, who were usually impatient. It is also clear that, within a group setting,
subjects did not vote in accordance with their individual preferences.
In addition, we compared discount factors for indifference values elicited at the
same date for a delayed outcome with delays ∆ = 4 weeks and 2∆ = 8 weeks. The
difference gives information about the shape of impatience in our experiment. If the
discount factor for a 8-week delay was proportionally higher than (resp. equal to,
lower than) the elicited discount factor for a 4-week delay, then the decision maker
was said to show decreasing (resp. constant, increasing) impatience. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of differences in discount rates as well as their values for individual
group members. In this figure, the left part of the x-axis corresponds to decreasing
impatience (as is usually reported by the experimental literature); the right part of
the x-axis corresponds to increasing impatience. Decreasing impatience was dom-
inant (58%) for individual decisions. Epper et al. (2011) obtain much the same
proportion (54%) but Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) find that fewer than 17% of
subjects satisfy diminishing impatience. So even when controlling for transactions
costs and payment risk, we still find behavior compatible with a quasi-hyperbolic
model at the individual level for a slight majority of subjects. At the same time,
however, we also observe that a not insignificant (15%) proportion of individual
choices are characterized by increasing impatience, which is not compatible with
the quasi-hyperbolic model. In line with the results presented previously, constant
impatience (characterized by a zero difference in discount rates) was dominant for
collective decisions. Figure 2 clearly indicates that constant impatience at the group
level cannot be entirely explained by group member’s constant impatience. It also
shows that final votes (represented by gray crosses) did not align exactly with indi-
vidual preferences.
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Figure 2: Shape of impatience for individuals (dots) and groups (solid line).
This graph plots the cumulative distribution function for differences in the group monthly discount factors
elicited with a 4-week delay and a 8-week delay. The groups are separated by horizontal gray lines. For
each group, black dots mark the average discount factors of its individual members and gray crosses
indicate the average votes of those members (The figure does not show one outlier with a highly negative
difference).
Stationarity
Stationarity predicts the equality of the elicited values in the upper two rows in Table
2. Figure 3 shows the distributions of stationarity indexes for individuals and groups.
If the index has a positive (resp. negative) value, then individuals were less (resp.
more) patient for a decision made at date t than when the receipts were delayed by
the same amount of time. A negative value of the index of stationarity mean that
individuals were more patient for a decision made at date t than when the receipts
were delayed by the same amount of time. According to the literature, we should
expect positive values to predominate. Figure 3 shows this was indeed the case at the
individual level – especially in Session 2, when stationarity was evaluated at t+ ∆.
It is clear from the figure that groups generally exhibited more stationarity than
did individuals, who generally had non-zero indexes. The vast majority of groups
replicated the same patient decision in all of their deliberations and behaved as zero-
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discounting maximizers. The picture is different for decisions made by individuals,
whose behavior was incompatible with stationarity. In this respect, the minority of
subjects who made patient choices coexisted with the majority of impatient subjects
who did not and therefore violated stationarity.7
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Figure 3: Stationarity indexes.
This graph plots the cumulative distribution function for the group indexes of stationarity at t and t+∆.
Horizontal gray lines separate the groups, and black dots mark the individual indexes of stationarity.
Dynamic Consistency and Age Independence
Dynamic consistency predicts the equality of the elicited values only for those cases
in which the time of the decision changes. Age independence predicts the equality
of the elicited values within rows. We found evidence of both dynamic consistency
and age independence being violated by individual decisions but no such evidence
regarding collective decisions. Figures 4 and 5 shows the distributions of (respec-
tively) dynamic consistency indexes and age independence indexes for groups and
7 The tables in Appendix A show the values of the indexes of stationarity, age independence, and
dynamic consistency for both individuals and groups (and their significance levels).
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individuals. For dynamic consistency, a negative (resp. positive) index corresponds
to decisions being less (resp. more) patient than planned in the previous session.
Figure 4 reveals that dynamic consistency was achieved at the group level but not
at the individual level. The difference was especially noticeable for sessions 2 and 3,
where negative values at the individual level predominated and so individuals were
less patient than planned. This figure also shows the contrast – in terms of dynam-
ically consistent decisions – between group-level homogeneity and individual-level
heterogeneity within-group.
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Figure 4: Dynamic Consistency indexes.
This graph plots the cumulative distribution function for the group indexes of dynamic consistency at
t+ ∆ and t+ 2∆. Horizontal gray lines separate the groups, and black dots mark the individual indexes
of dynamic consistency.
Figure 5 establishes that age independence was achieved at the group level. Our
findings on dynamic consistency and age independence were compatible with those
on stationarity, which confirms that the the first two conditions together imply
the third. In both cases, groups were highly time-consistent. There is evidence of
age independence being violated at the individual level, especially with regard to
t + ∆. In that case, we found the average index to be significantly greater than
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zero, indicative of more patient decisions in later sessions. This result contrasts
with the findings of Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013), who report hardly any violations
of age independence in individual choices. No systematic pattern of group vis-
a`-vis individual decisions emerges from Figure 5. Collective age-independence is
variously associated with different types of groups: those containing only positive-
index members, those with a mix of (say) three positive-index and two zero-index
members, and those with only zero-index members.
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Figure 5: Age independence indexes.
This graph plots the cumulative distribution function for the group indexes of age independence at t+ ∆
and t+ 2∆. Horizontal gray lines separate the groups, and black dots mark the individual indexes of age
independence.
3.2 Coordination Mechanism
Efficiency of Straw Polls
The efficiency of straw polls in achieving coordination was assessed by comparing
the final vote with the last message sent to the other group members. Overall,
efficiency was high: 87.5% of the final votes were strictly identical to the intentions
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declared in the last straw poll. Efficiency declined between experimental sessions
from 92.8% in session 1 to 81.9% in session 2 and 82.1% in session 3. Nonetheless,
we found no differences between the values cast as final votes and the intentions
declared in the last straw poll (all p > 0.22, t-tests). Figure 6 graphs the relation
between values casted in the last straw poll and the final votes. Only a small portion
of votes were above (7.7%) or below (4.8%) the value cast in the last straw poll.
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Figure 6: Efficiency in coordination.
This graph plots the values x cast in the last straw poll against final votes. Circles’ dimensions are
proportional to the number of observations.
Distance to Individual Preferences
In order to compare collective decisions and individual preferences, we first evaluated
the distance between the outcome of collective decisions and the elicited individual
values. Overall, 35.8% of the final group decisions were identical to those made by
individuals. This percentage was stable across sessions, which suggests that reaching
a collective decision in choice over time may be nonnegligibly more expensive than
relying on individual preferences. Among the final decisions, 97% corresponded to
patient choices; even so, votes differed from individual values (all p < 0.01). Slightly
more than half (54%) of decision choices were made more patiently by groups than
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by individuals. For a minority (8%) of choices, the collective decision was actually
more impatient than the corresponding individually preferred decision. For 78% of
patient individuals, more than four out of six final decisions were in line with their
individual preferences; in contrast, for no impatient individual was any collective
decision in line with his individual preference.
One can also measure the distance to individual preferences by simulating the
equivalent values that a benevolent planner would select for each decision. The
simulation assumes that this planner can perfectly observe the elicited values at
the individual level and aggregate them at the group level by summing individual
values.8 We found that, on half of the measures, the utilitarian planner would
implement a decision that is incompatible with stationarity (detailed results are
given in Table 6 in Appendix A). Dynamic consistency and age independence were
also violated by simulated choices of this type. These results replicate Jackson and
Yariv’s (2014) findings that the benevolent social planners do not make consistent
choices. Our social planner results are strongly consistent with individual results
and indicate that collective decisions differ from decisions based on criteria that
sum up and/or average indifferences. These findings demonstrate also that group
composition has no effect on the extent to which stationarity, age independence, or
dynamic consistency are violated.
3.3 Robustness
Several confounding factors might have played a role in our results. First, the group
decisions in our experiment resulted from a combination of voting and signaling
through straw polls. To disentangle the effects of these factors, we ran two additional
treatments to elicit indifference values x11, x
2
1, x
3
1, with N = 60 individuals each.
We began by setting up a Voting treatment based on majority voting without
straw polls. In this treatment, we asked subjects to vote on a collective decision
8 Two subjects dropped out after session 1 and two more after session 2. The resultant missing data
precluded our simulating a utilitarian criterion for three of the groups, which is why the simulation results
are given only for nine of the twelve groups.
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but without any additional information on the others’ preference for that decision.
We then set up an Informed planner treatment in which subjects individually
decided for the whole group; in this treatment, subjects voted in a single straw poll
before each decide alone – as a planner – for the group. The Voting treatment,
which consists of a vote with no preliminary straw polls, allows us to identify a pure
effect of voting on collective decisions.
The Informed planner treatment, which consists of decisions being made for
the group after a single straw poll, reveals the effect of providing some information
on individual preferences. In that treatment, individuals decide alone for the whole
group. Strict self-interest would call for the decision maker to align group outcomes
with her individual preferences and so, if collective choice differs from individual
choice, then decision-making subjects can be expected to account for the effects that
their own choices have on others. We also implemented an Uninformed planner
treatment (with N = 20 subjects) to check for the possibility that other-regarding
considerations could play a role in group choices. In this treatment, subjects were
asked to decide for the whole group while having no information on the others’
preferences. If subjects’ concerns about group outcomes are different from their
own concerns, then their choices in a collective context should differ when made in
an individual context.
According to Charness and Rabin (2002), three kinds of social preferences could
explain why individuals are concerned about the payoff to others: efficiency con-
cerns, aversion to inequity or reciprocity considerations. These concerns might be
even stronger in settings (e.g., the Planner treatments) where individuals are re-
quired to decide not only for themselves but also for others. In our experiment,
aversion to inequity could not play a role because the group payoff was equally
shared among group members. Note also that any role played by reciprocity con-
siderations would be minor owing to the low number of successive choice iterations.
That being said, informational feedback between participants in the Informed
planner treatment could have been a source of reciprocity. We cannot rule this
possibility out, but we did ensure anonymity by rematching colors within each group
and thereby reduced that possible source of reciprocity. Observe that in the Unin-
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formed planner treatment there was no informational feedback during iterations,
which precluded any reciprocity based on informational feedback.
We are thus led to conclude that social preferences are explained by the efficiency
concern, implemented as a strategy to maximize the group’s payoff. A planner
opting for this strategy would always choose the larger-later option irrespective of his
own individual preference. We found small support for this hypothesis (p = 0.45).9
We also ran several Probit regression models to measure the difference between the
main experiment and the additional treatments. The first regression amounted to
estimating a Probit model of impatience. For that purpose, the decision maker was
classified as impatient (resp. patient) if at least two of the three indifference values
(x11, x
2
1, x
3
1) yielded an impatient (resp. patient) answer. We next estimated a Probit
model on stationarity; here the decision maker’s behavior satisfied stationarity when
x11 equalled x
2
1. Each Probit model was estimated both for individuals and for
collective decisions. Table 3 reports our regression results in the form of marginal
effects (with the main experiment as the reference level).
This table reveals the effect of these additional treatments on individual and
collective decisions. First, group decisions displayed significantly more patience as
well as more stationarity in the main experiment than in the additional treatments.
Neither voting or choosing alone (as a planner) for the whole group can explain the
highly consistent decisions observed in the main experiment. However, we found
that individual preferences were little affected by additional treatments. Individual
stationarity, when measured at the subject level, does not differ significantly between
the main experiment and the additional treatments. Thus our results indicate that
neither efficiency nor other-regarding preferences is a real concern for participants
acting as a planner: in both Planner treatments, individual choices do not differ
significantly from group choices. Yet under the Voting treatment we observe – in
line with previous literature (Schram, 2004) – a mild positive correlation between
the group choice and the median of individual choices (Pearson correlation of 0.43).
9 With regard to one of Session 1’s three tasks (viz., elicitation of x31), we found that group decisions
were more patient than individual decisions (p = 0.04).
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Impatience Stationarity
treatment Individual Groups Individuals Groups
Repetition 0.233∗ - -0.083 -
(0.091) - (0.127) -
Voting 0.133 0.475∗∗ -0.117 -0.454∗∗
(0.080) (0.075) (0.090) (0.076)
Informed planner 0.167∗ 0.392∗∗ -0.167 -0.420∗∗
(0.078) (0.079) (0.088) (0.077)
Uninformed planner 0.083 0.525∗∗ -0.033 -0.338∗∗
(0.114) (0.102) (0.129) (0.120)
Table 3: Probit regressions on impatience and violations of stationarity for individual and
collective decisions (N = 220).
Note: Reported figures are the marginal effects. Significant at ∗5%, ∗∗1%.
Individual impatience differed between the main and both the repetition and
the Informed planner treatments. In the latter treatment, the greater impatience
observed when an individual member is deciding for the group – based on one straw
poll of member preferences – might well be due to a composition effect. As described
previously, subjects in the Informed planner treatment were individually more
impatient than in the main experiment. It is therefore possible that the information
included in the straw poll might have reduced the impatience of group outcomes
to a greater extent than was observed in the Informed planner treatment. The
observed difference in impatience between the main experiment and the Repetition
treatment (described in the next paragraph) is the most difficult to explain because
their designs differed only in that the latter excluded group decisions. In particular,
both treatments required that each subject come to the laboratory three times
at regularly scheduled intervals. If the scheduling ability of subjects led to our
experiment to suffer from a selection bias as regards impatience, then we should
have observed no difference between the main experiment and the Repetition
treatment as well as significant differences between that experiment and the three
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other additional treatments; however, these outcomes did not obtain. Finally, we
remark that collective decisions in the Informed planner treatment replicate
Jackson and Yariv’s (2014) finding that the decisions made by a benevolent planner
does not satisfy stationarity when the planner is herself affected by those decisions.
Luhan et al. (2009) show that individual behavior can be changed simply by
learning and repetition. To explore the possibility of our results being confounded
by this dynamic, we set up a Repetition treatment that replicates the experiment
with N = 20 individuals. This treatment was identical to the main experiment ex-
cept that subjects made twice as many individual decisions (across all three sessions)
and were not involved in any collective decision; for the instructions, see Appendix
D for the instructions). We found no individual-level differences between the two
repeated decisions in any of the three sessions (p = 0.34).
4 Discussion and conclusions
This paper presents a within-subject longitudinal laboratory experiment on collec-
tive time preferences. We are the first to study four properties of time preferences
– impatience, stationarity, age independence, and dynamic consistency – for both
individuals and groups. In addition, we have designed a collective mechanism that
helps groups coordinate on a decision. Our main findings are that: (i) individuals
were impatient and tended not to behave in a manner consistent with constant
discounting; (ii) groups made patient and highly consistent decisions; and (iii) the
decision process made subjects converge to dynamically consistent decisions that
satisfied both stationarity and age independence. Furthermore, the patient deci-
sions made by groups indicate that the discount factors of groups are more in line
with market interest rates than are the discount factors of individuals.
Our results show that individuals gravitate toward making patient decisions
when placed in an environment broader than one delineated by purely individual
decisions. This generalization is robust to all the decision contexts that we im-
plemented. First, under our coordination mechanism based on majority voting
preceded by a deliberation phase, almost every subject moved toward a patient
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vote regardless of his group’s composition and of his own preferences. Second, our
robustness checks confirmed that, absent the deliberation phase, simple-majority
voting was also followed by collective choices exhibiting more patience than individ-
ual choices (although the effect was weaker in that non-deliberating context). The
shift toward patience was evident also when subjects served in the social planner
role – whether informed or uninformed about others’ preferences. This result speaks
to the long-standing debate over the ethics of social discounting and to more recent
results from evolutionary theory. For instance, Robson and Szentes (2014) argue
that individuals exhibit more patience when decisions are made collectively owing
to a difference between individual and group evolutionary selection.
A participant with full access to perfect credit markets should not display any
violation of the conditions on time preferences, from which it follows that choices
made at the individual level should be stationary and dynamically consistent. Yet
because our groups have no existence outside the laboratory, there is no reason to
believe that access to credit justifies patient, stationary and/or dynamically con-
sistent choices. In fact, we obtain precisely the opposite result: choices are more
consistent and patient at the group level than at the individual level. This finding
leaves open the source of violations at the individual level. One possible explana-
tion could be that the greater deliberation time associated with a group decision
helps reduce individuals’ errors. Any such cognitive spillover effect would presum-
ably have spanned the three experimental sessions, so individual violations should
no longer be evident in Sessions 2 and 3; however, the results were not compatible
with that hypothesis. Another possible explanation is instability at the individual
level. That all three conditions (stationarity, dynamic consistency, age indepen-
dence) were violated at the individual level on only half on the measures strongly
suggests unstable intertemporal preferences for at least some individuals. We affirm
the call of Meier and Sprenger (2015) for future research on how best to identify
individuals with unstable preferences in choice over time.
One limitation of this research is that the experimental design we implemented
could have influenced the main results. A typical drawback in experiments that elicit
time preferences is the uncertainty of future payoffs (Halevy, 2015; Augenblick et al.,
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2015). Having uncertain prospects could raise the impatience levels for subjects,
whose time preferences may then begin to incorporate a risk premium (Halevy, 2008;
Epper et al., 2011; Baucells and Heukamp, 2012; Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2012). We
took such uncertainty out of play by offering high monetary payoffs and guaranteeing
payment through bank transfers by the National Public Treasury. Although that
approach could have tilted the scales toward behavior that is more patient, we
believe that the benefits of this incentive structure outweigh its drawbacks.
Another possible limitation is that some of our results could be explained by
a selection bias. In our experiment – as in most experiments seeking to develop
longitudinal measures – subjects were asked to commit to multiple (here, three)
sessions over an extended time period (here, 8 weeks). Our subjects thus share the
ability to schedule time commitments (Frederick, 2005; Dohmen et al., 2010; Perez-
Arce, 2011). Even so, the proportion of dynamically consistent individual choices
that we found is no higher than what has been reported in the literature.10 We
remark that the additional treatment used to test the effect of repeated decisions
was based on an identical scheduling of sessions and likewise indicated no such
selection bias. Finally, consider that this selection bias would probably influence all
decisions to a similar extent and so would have little effect on the difference between
individual and collective decisions.
A third limitation of our experimental design is that indifference values above
y (e 100 in individual decisions and e 500 in collective decisions) could not be
chosen. Because indifference values were thus censored at y, our experiment ruled
out the the possibility of negative time preferences. With regard to real-effort tasks,
(Casari and Dragone, 2015) document that negative time preference can arise in
a longitudinal experiment involving losses. Recall that our experiment addressed
monetary gains only, for which negative discounting is less frequent than in the loss
domain (Abdellaoui et al., 2013).
10 Gine´ et al. (2014) find that 50% of the choices satisfy stationarity and 35% satisfy dynamic consis-
tency. In Study 1 of Sayman and O¨ncu¨ler (2009), the authors find no evidence favoring time inconsistency:
58% of the choices were dynamically consistent. Halevy (2015) report that 48% of time-consistent subjects
and 56% of all subjects exhibit stationary preferences.
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We adopted majority voting as a procedure for coming to a group decision
after a deliberation phase.11 In this context, majority voting corresponds to a
coordination game and in theory can lead to multiple equilibria (Plott, 1967); hence
we cannot rule out the possibility of strategic voting. When applied to collective
time preferences, majority voting on the most immediate reward x equivalent to
a given delayed reward y results in multiple equilibria provided that the group
consists of more than three voters. Multiple equilibria arise also when agents have
incomplete information about characteristics of the game structure (Myerson and
Weber, 1993). As a result, anything can happen in equilibrium for such multi-
candidate elections (Palfrey, 2009). To help participants coordinate their choices
on a unique equilibrium and avoid dominated equilibria, we added a deliberation
phase based on successive straw polls. In a different setting, Brandts and Cooper
(2006) show that feedback on other preferences could help overcome coordination
failures. We find that choosing collectively patient choices made coordination easier
– not only for groups in which most subjects agreed upon patience at the outset
but also for groups in which patience was not initially the prevailing characteristic.
This finding is evidence that information exchanges during the deliberation phase
played a specific role in the final group outcome. Specifically, sharing information
on voting intentions might have led individuals to vote against their own preference
(a finding that could alternatively be explained by strategic voting; see Myerson and
Weber, 1993). That result is consistent also with existing psychological evidence on
group decisions (Stoner, 1968; Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Schkade et al., 2000),
with the literature on information exchange (Viscusi et al., 2011) and with both
theoretical and empirical papers on polarization (Glaeser and Sunstein, 2009; Luhan
et al., 2009; Sobel, 2014). When opinions are more polarized, more extreme group
decisions are made as compared with the preferences of individual group members.
According to our results, this observation can be explained by the relatively more
patient subjects having the greatest influence on final decisions.
11 Rather than voting on a common decision, subjects could have coordinated on a sharing rule (Millner
and Heal, 2014). Because this alternative mechanism did not allowed for direct comparisons between
individual and collective preferences, we opted for a political (voting) approach.
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Finally, our coordinating device of successive straw polls allowed groups to con-
verge quickly on a given decision. In this respect, our results have implications for
how boards and committees can achieve consistent decisions. A natural consequence
of this coordinating device is the shifting of individual preferences. Almost all shifts
were in the direction of increased patience – a tendency that was confirmed by the
additional treatments. In comparison with individual decisions, collective decisions
more often produced a consistent sequence of preference relations over time.
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Appendix A Indexes
This appendix reports values of the indexes of violation of stationarity (Table 4),
dynamic consistency (Figure 4), and age independence (Figure 5).
Stationarity
measured at t at t+ ∆
Individuals 0.883 2.121∗
Groups -0.417 0.583
Table 4: Violations of stationarity for individuals and groups.
Note: Reported figures are the average values of indexes (no violation corresponds to a value of zero).
Significant at ∗5%.
Dynamic Consistency Age Independence
measured at t+ ∆ at t+ 2∆ from t (1) from t (2) from t+ ∆
Individuals 1.103 -3.357∗∗ 2.017 -1.161 3.224∗
Groups -0.683 -0.950 -1.100 -0.367 -0.100
Table 5: Violations of dynamic consistency and age independence for individuals and
groups.
Note: Reported figures are the average values of indexes (no violation corresponds to a value of zero).
Significant at ∗5%, ∗∗1%.
40
Stationarity Dynamic Consistency Age Independence
measured at t at t+ ∆ from t (1) from t (2) from t+ ∆ at t+ ∆ at t+ 2∆
Planner 0.800 2.533∗ 0.689 -3.844∗ 1.489 -1.311 3.222∗
Table 6: Violations of stationarity, age independence and dynamic consistency – Utilitar-
ian criterion based on the sum of individual values.
Note: Reported figures are the average values of indexes (no violation corresponds to a value of zero).
Significant at ∗5%.
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Appendix B Experimental Instructions
The experiment was conducted from January to March 2012 at LABEX-EM, the
experimental lab of the University of Rennes. Subjects were recruited using the
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) software, and the experiment was run using a purpose-
written software coded in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In the recruitment phase,
subjects were informed that they would be required to participate in three successive5
experimental sessions scheduled at regular (four-week) intervals. Before entering the
lab, subjects had to confirm their willingness to make that commitment. The rest
of this appendix translates into English the instructions that participating subjects
received.
General Instructions10
Thank you for participating in our experiment. During this experiment, you will
have to make decisions involving various amounts of money. If you follow the in-
structions, you could win quite a large amount of money. All your responses will be
converted into anonymous data after the experiment. During the experiment, you
must answer a series of choice questions. There are no right or wrong answers to15
these questions. We are interested in your preferences: the only right answer to a
choice task is the choice that you prefer.
Twenty people will participate in this experimental session. During the session, you
will have to make decisions individually and collectively. Therefore, you will decide
alone on some decisions and will interact with other participants on other decisions.20
For reasons of anonymity, you will not have access to the other participants’ iden-
tities.
The experiment consists of two parts:
• in the first [second] part, you will decide as an individual;
• in the second [first] part, you will make a decision in common as a member of25
a group of five people (i.e., you and four other people).
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Gains and Payment
Your final payment will be determined by the choices you made during the exper-
iment. For your participation, you will receive a show-up fee of e20. This fee is
conditional on your participation in the three experimental sessions. The show-up30
fee will be paid at the end of the third experimental session only if you attend all
three of the sessions.
During the experiment, you will be asked to answer a series of choice questions
regarding different amounts of money available at different dates. The display rep-
resented in Figure 7 gives an example of one such series. Option A offers a fixed35
amount of e100 to be obtained in 4 weeks’ time. Option B offers a series of six
amounts, equally ranged between e50 and e100, to be obtained tomorrow. For each
of the six amounts, you will be asked to indicate whether you would like to choose
option A or option B. Once you have switched between option A and option B, a
scrollbar will appear on the screen. The scrollbar allows you to refine the amount40
of money at which you switch your choice from A to B. For instance, suppose you
switch at e72.
If you switch at e72, do you agree that you prefer to choose option B at a higher
amount than e72? (Y/N). Do you agree that you prefer to wait 4 weeks and choose
option A at prices lower than e72? (Y/N). If you have any questions, please feel45
free to ask the experimenter.
The payment will be implemented as follows. At the end of each experimental
session, four participants will be selected at random from among the twenty partici-
pants attending the session. For each of these participants, the computer will select
one decision at random. For that decision, the computer will select one possible50
choice at random. Let’s take the decision represented in Figure 7 as an example.
For that decision, an integer between 50 and 100 will be selected at random.
If the computer draws 63, then the selected choice is between e63 tomorrow and
e100 in 4 weeks’ time. Do you agree? (Y/N). If you chose e72 as a switching point,
then your selected choice is therefore e100 in four weeks’ time and you will receive55
your payment directly by bank transfer from the National Treasury within 4 weeks.
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Do you agree? (Y/N).
Suppose that instead the computer draws 83; then the selected choice is between
e83 tomorrow and e100 in 4 weeks’ time. Do you agree? (Y/N). If you chose
e72 as a switching point, then your selected choice is therefore e83 tomorrow and60
you will receive your payment directly by bank transfer from the National Treasury
tomorrow. Do you agree? (Y/N). If you have any questions, please feel free to ask
the experimenter.
At the end of the experimental session, you will get a receipt from the University
of Rennes 1 for the payment.65
Individual Decisions
For these decisions, you will have to reply alone to a series of choice questions
regarding different amounts of money available at different dates. The display rep-
resented in Figure 7 shows an example of a series of questions. Option A offers a
fixed amount of e100 to be obtained in 4 weeks’ time. Option B offers a series of70
six amounts, equally ranged between e50 and e100, to be obtained tomorrow. For
each of the six amounts, you will be asked to indicate whether you would like to
choose option A or option B. Once you will have switched between option A and
option B, a scrollbar will appear. The scrollbar allows you to refine the amount of
money at which you switch your choice from A to B.75
Once you will have selected a switching point, you can continue by clicking on “OK”.
You can also cancel your choice. When you click on “OK”, a confirmation screen
will appear and you can proceed with the next decision.
Collective Decisions
For collective decisions, you will have to reply in groups of five to a series of choice80
questions regarding different amounts of money available at different dates. For
these decisions, a display similar to the one represented in Figure 9 will appear.
This display will allow you to communicate with the other members of the group
before deciding as a group. All the collective amounts will be shared equally among
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the group members. For collective decisions, the majority rule will apply: for each85
choice, whenever at least three of the five members agree, their choice will be adopted
by the group. The decision will be made after four successive displays of voting
intentions for each group member and a final vote. Groups will remain the same for
all decisions; in other words, you will make a group decision with the same people
each time. For reasons of anonymity, you will be identified by a color for each90
decision. Colors will be reshuﬄed randomly between each decision.
For the first trial, you will be presented with a display similar to the one represented
in Figure 8. Option A offers a fixed amount of e500 to be obtained by the group in
four weeks’ time. Option B offers a series of six amounts, equally ranged between
e250 and e500, to be obtained by the group tomorrow. For each of the six amounts,95
you will be asked to indicate whether you would like the group to choose option A
or option B. Once you have switched between option A and option B, a scrollbar
will appear. The scrollbar allows you to refine the amount of money at which you
switch your choice from A to B. Suppose you switch at e350.
If you switch at e350, do you agree that you prefer the group to choose option B100
at a higher amount than e350? (Y/N). Do you agree that you prefer the group to
wait four weeks and choose option A at a lower amount than e350? (Y/N). If you
have any questions, please feel free to ask the experimenter.
Once you have selected a switching point, you can continue by clicking on “OK”.
When you click on “OK”, your opinion will be sent to the other members of the105
group and you will get their opinions.
The results of the trial will be displayed along with the next decision to be made
(Figure 9).The display will enable you to see the opinions of the other members of
the group. The results of the previous trial will show you, for each possible choice
between option A and option B, whether or not a majority has been reached. After110
four successive trials, the decision you make will be the final vote for your group.
After that decision, the result of the vote will appear (Figure 10). The screen
will display the votes of each member, the group switching point, and your share.
Suppose that the decision of your group led to a switching point of e349.
If your group switches at e349, do you agree that a majority of members prefer to115
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choose option B at a higher amount than e349? (Y/N). Do you agree that, if the
selected amount is lower than e349 amount, you would get your share which is 100
euros in 4 weeks times? Do you agree that a majority of the members would prefer
to wait 4 weeks and get option A at a lower amount than 349 euros? (Y/N). Do you
agree that, if the selected amount is equal to e472 (higher than e349), you would120
get your share, which is e83.6 tomorrow? If you have any questions, please feel free
to ask the experimenter.
Once your group has made a decision, you can proceed with the next decision.
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Appendix C Displays
This appendix shows the typical displays used in the experiment. Figure 7 shows the
multiple-choice list used to elicit indifference points; Figure 8 shows the equivalent
multiple-choice list used to elicit indifference points for the first straw poll. Figure 9
displays the information each subject received at the end of each sequence. Figure 10
shows the final screen presented to the subject after a vote.
Figure 7: Presentation of choice list in individual decisions.
Figure 8: Presentation of choice list in collective decisions – First straw poll.
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Figure 9: Information given about other member preferences during the group decision
process.
Figure 10: Presentation of a collective decision.
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Appendix D Experimental Instructions: Ad-
ditional Treatments
The instructions in the additional treatments were based on those described pre-
viously in Appendix B. Here we list the changes in those instructions for each
treatment.
REPETITION treatment
• lines 18–26: Twenty people will participate in this experimental session. During
the session, you will have to make decisions individually.
The experiment consists of two parts:
– in the first part, you will decide as an individual;
– in the second part, you will decide as an individual.
• lines 79–130: deleted.
VOTING treatment
• lines 29–32: For your participation, you will receive a show-up fee of e4
• lines 87–88: deleted
• lines 90–91: deleted
• line 92: For the first trial deleted
• lines 105–111: The decision you make will be the vote for your group. Once
you have selected a switching point for the vote, you can continue by clicking
on ”OK”.
INFORMED PLANNER treatment
• lines 18–26: Twenty people will participate in this experimental session. During
the session, you will have to make decisions individually for yourself and for a
group. Therefore, you will decide for yourself on some decisions and for you
and other participants on other decisions. For reasons of anonymity, you will
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not have access to the other participants’ identities.
The experiment consists of two parts:
– in the first [second ] part, you will decide as an individual;
– in the second [first ] part, you will decide for a group of five people (i.e.,
you and four other people).
• lines 29–32: For your participation, you will receive a show-up fee of e4
• lines 80–81: For collective decisions, you will have to reply for a group of five
to a series of choice questions regarding different amounts of money available
at different dates.
• lines 84–88: . . . before making a decision for the group. All the collective
amounts will be shared equally among the members of the group. Each member
of the group will make his/her choice for the group. Payments will be based
on the decision of one member of the group chosen at random. The decision
will be made after one display of opinions for each group member.
• line 92: For the first trial deleted
• lines 109–112: After this display, the decision you take will be your decision
for the group. After that decision the result of your choice will appear.
• lines 115 and 117: you replaces a majority of members
• line 123: Once you have made a decision, you can proceed with the next deci-
sion.
UNINFORMED PLANNER treatment
The changes for this treatment are the same as those just described for the In-
formed planner treatment plus the following changes for lines 80–115.
• lines 80–88: For collective decisions, you will have to reply for a group of five
individuals to a series of choice questions regarding different amounts of money
available at different dates. All the collective amounts will be shared equally
among the members of the group. Each member of the group will make his/her
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choice for the group. Payments will be based on the decision of one member
of the group chosen at random.
• line 92: For the first trial deleted
• lines 105–114: After your decision, the result of you choice will appear.
Appendix E Results for the Additional Treat-
ments
For the Repetition treatment, a decision maker was classified as impatient (resp.
patient) if at least four of six indifference values yielded an impatient (resp. patient)
answer; otherwise, the decision maker was classified as mixed. For the remaining
additional treatments (Voting treatment, Informed planner treatment, Unin-
formed planner treatment), a decision maker was classified as impatient (patient)
if at least two out of three indifference values yielded an impatient (patient) answer.
The classifications are presented in Table 7. Tables 8 to 11 report additional results
on stationarity, dynamic consistency, age independence, shape of impatience and
distance to individual preferences.
Treatment Condition Impatient Patient Mixed
repetition initial answer 80% 15% 5%
repeated answer 75% 15% 10%
voting individual 80% 20% -
group 75% 25% -
informed individual 83.3% 16.7% -
planner for the group 67.7% 33.3% -
uninformed individual 75% 25% -
planner for the group 80% 20% -
Table 7: Classification of answers under the additional treatments.
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Treatment Condition measured at t measured at t+ ∆
repetition initial answer 3.35 1.47
repeated answer 0.50 0.105
voting individual 0.10 -
group 4.73∗ -
informed individual 0.35 -
planner for the group 3.34∗∗ -
uninformed individual -0.65 -
planner for the group 0.09 -
Table 8: Violations of stationarity.
Note: Reported figures are the average values of indexes (no violation corresponds to a value of zero).
Significant at ∗5%, ∗∗ at 1%.
Dynamic Consistency Age Independence
measured at t+ ∆ at t+ 2∆ from t (1) from t (2) from t+ ∆
Initial answer -4.210 1.790 -0.421 2.842 3.263
Repeated answer -1.053 2.053 -0.790 1.368 2.158
Table 9: Violations of dynamic consistency and age independence in the repeated treat-
ment.
Note: Reported figures are the average values of indexes (no violation corresponds to a value of zero).
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Treatment Condition Increasing Constant Decreasing
Impatience Impatience Impatience
repetition Initial answer 5% 10% 85%
repeated answer 20% 10% 70%
voting Individual 30% 13.3% 56.7%
Group 16.7% 16.7% 66.7%
informed individual 28.3% 16.7% 55%
planner for the group 15% 30% 55%
uninformed individual 40% 20% 40%
planner for the group 25% 20% 55%
Table 10: Classification of individuals and groups by shape of impatience.
Treatment Identical decisions More patient Less patient
voting 22.2% 51.1% 26.7%
informed planner 31.7% 57.2% 11.1%
uninformed planner 28.3% 46.7% 25%
Table 11: Distance to individual preferences.
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